Nvard Manasyan published her analyses on Armenia’s foreign policy in the context of the ongoing international developments tied to Turkey.
Manasyan’s analysis starts with the retrospective look at Turkey’s history. “In 14th century Osmans were one of the Turkmen tribes trying to control the Eastern Rome, and as claimed the Turkish author Finkel, no one could have had an idea that this one from the rival tribes will be the founder of the empire, which lasted 700 years. The dream of the first Sultan Osman about a tree grown from moon sunken in his abdomen, in the shade of which many people hide, a century later, in 1323 became the most competitive founding myth of the empire. Thus, it affected the incumbent rulers to ground the spread of the power in the Balkans, the Middle East nations and Western Armenia.
Davutoglu, who earned a reputation of backstage architect since 2002 and Turkey’s Foreign Minister in 2009, with the help of “zero problems with neighbors” policy made an attempt to return to the starting point of pre-republican Turkey, updating cultural and historical ties with the people who have lived within the empire. It is noteworthy that Turkey’s neo-Ottoman transformations became visible when in 2003 before the U.S. invasion in Iraq, Turkey, as a NATO member, rejected the U.S. to provide its territory. Two risky steps that have some explanation, and probably cannot exist outside of pragmatism, because it goes to the geopolitical interests. Of course, the Cold War is history, and the hope to become a member of the European Union, in fact, was impossible, but why were there such strict changes?”
The author then refers to several historic events, namely Turkey’s rebirth after World War, creation of Israel and Western countries shaping real levers of equilibrium this way in the Middle East, domestic events in Israel itself in 1989, and the Israeli-Palestinian issue. At the same time, Manasyan recalls Kurdistan Workers’ Party in Turkey receiving support from Iran and the Soviet Union and carrying out series of armed action in a few large cities.
After historical reference outlining the scene of international developments so far, the author notes that Islamic countries, which would endanger the existence of Israel and the spread of Western values are not already profitable for the West.
Coming to new geopolitical reality, Mansyan adds Europe and China as “an interesting couple in terms of civilization” referring to them as “alter egos of each other.” “China is already an economic superpower, and according to analysts, in case it levels to the U.S. in arms race in 2018, it will act as a classic case of equal power, which in contrast to Europe and the United States also has a demographic advantage. In 2020, according the United Nations forecasts, it will exceed the population of Europe (including Russia) and the United Nations. In particular, this is a problem for Russia, which in such dangerous demographic conditions forces to make a decision within the meaning of civilization.”
Pointing to this Russian “inability” of large-scale actions in terms of international affairs, Manasyan comments on Armenia’s priorities stating “And where will be Armenia, which signed the Armenian-Turkish protocols, promised to support Turkey in international organizations, changed the law for language, organized Russian language textbooks in general education, held Russian flag in the territory of Armenia. Which would be equally competitive ideology to Osman’s dream or rebuilding of Solomon’s temple in order Armenia in this political triangle not to become a key of geopolitical influence and Eurasian quest compass, but to set Middle East triangle with Israel and Kurdistan with the composition triangle?”
