Alexei Makarkin (First Vice-President of the Center for Political Technologies) touched upon Russia’s foreign policy in the context of Putin’s birthday anniversary.
For his birthday, Vladimir Putin received two foreign-policy gifts. Firstly, at the parliamentary elections in Georgia defeated the party, perhaps, of his most hated foreign politician Mikheil Saakashvili. And then – right at Putin’s birthday- Hugo Chavez, Russia’s main partner in Latin America, won the presidential election, probably the most difficult one in his life.
But both gifts are not so unequivocal, as it seems at first glance. Future Georgian authorities, of course, attract less opposition in the Kremlin than Saakashvili (although there is not much sympathy, for example towards Irakli Alasania, “second man” in the team of Bidzina Ivanishvili). But the problem of Russia’s foreign policy is the desire to get it all at once, “here and now”. The perception of the post-Soviet space as a Russian sphere of influence leads to a rigid division of politicians into “our” and “their”, and at the present time to the number of “our” belong those, who are willing to refuse to cooperate with the West for the sake of the Customs Union. However, such are not too much – for example, now there are few, who recalls times, when two years ago Viktor Yanukovych was widely considered as a “man of the Kremlin.” He hasn’t past the Customs Union’s tests- and now Russian-Ukrainian relations are “frozen.”
It will be even more difficult with Ivanishvili and Alasania – no serious Georgian politician will agree to build strategic relations with Moscow, while it recognizes the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And Russia cannot simply refuse this recognition, because in this case none of the local leaders will take its policy in the Caucasus seriously. And if so, soon Georgia’s new leaders may well cause irritation in Moscow, especially when democratic change of power in the country can give impetus to its rapprochement with the West (for which such events are a vivid manifestation of democracy).
Now, about Venezuela, which Igor Sechin visited in the eve of the elections, overseeing informal relationship with the country. Chavez’s victory means preservation of Russian-Venezuelan strategic partnership in various fields – from the FEC to the MTC. In addition, the remoteness of Venezuela makes irrelevant the question of the Customs Union. But the situation is not so simple. Firstly, Chavez’s regime has a strongly pronounced personal character – it is unclear what will happen to him in case the leader withdraws from affairs at the future term (and such probability exists taking into account an oncological disease of the Venezuelan president).
Secondly, there exists erosion, which is although slow, but increasing support for the opposition candidate. Unlike Putin, Chavez could afford to have an opposition, which, although has certain restrictions, but still is allowed for the presidential elections in conditions of real claims to power. For comparison: none of the presidential candidates on the last three Russian elections not even dreamed of staying in the second round, although some of them showed results, distinct from statistical error. In fact, each of them was the sparring partner of the favorite.
What’s the matter then? Note that there are still a lot of the democratic traditions in Venezuela – the last dictator was overthrown in 1958 – and to break them without the threat of losing legitimacy Chavez cannot. On the contrary, in its rhetoric he constantly appeals to democracy, blaming politicians, related to oligarchy, that they have betrayed the ideals of the revolution of 1958. In Russia, there are less such traditions.
But, in addition, Chavez could stand the real opposition also because in the minds of the absolute majority of the population it is associated with the most ineffective and unpopular oligarchy. And Chavez is perceived as a benefactor, who provided broad masses with an access to education and health care. Initially, Putin was also acting “in contrast” to his predecessor (the effective and capable leader against a disappointing figure of “Yeltsin”). Later he was “the president of hope”, and now the motivation to vote for him is more and more reduced to a lack of alternative (which is not surprising in a tightly restricted access to presidential elections) and the fear of chaos in case of departure of “sovereign”. If access to education and health care are the competitive advantage of Chavez, then for Putin they are his vulnerable places – the state of affairs there draws active public criticism.
It is not surprising that at the election in2006 Chavez completely defeated his rival Manuel Rosales (62.8% versus 36.9% in the first round). But six years have passed and Chavez defeats Enrique Capriles, and again in the first round – the Venezuelan political system is bipolarized, and the other candidates do not receive even 1% of the vote, but with a much smaller gap (55% to 44.3%).Moreover, until the very last moment the election results were not clear, that is unique for the Chavez regime. Only a powerful flow to the polling stations, feared to lost of the usual benefits of the Venezuelan poor, (people took their places since evening!) provided the president with a victory – but even in these conditions, the result is far less convincing than before. Capriles was able to convince the former voters of Chavez, that he is not an “oligarch”, but left-centered, focused on contemporary Brazilian and Argentine experience. In addition, opposition activists were ready to organize an effective campaign and capable of other legal forms of political action: the fear that the election results will lead to civil strife was not justified – Capriles immediately congratulated Chavez on his victory after the results were known.
And it seems that this trend will continue to grow: the gradual proliferation of the middle class in the oil is decreasing popularity of the regime, which looks too archaic in the eyes of all the recent supporters. And here a certain parallel with Russia is traced- despite all the differences between the two countries.
Alexei Makarkin – First Vice-President of the Center for Political Technologies.
