The interlocutor of Radar Armenia is Shahan Gantaharyan.
– Yerevan’s proposal to withdraw the troops from the border is unacceptable for Baku. Bayramov stated that if the troops are withdrawn when there is no agreement on the border, there is no guarantee that nothing will happen there. How do you interpret the rejection of the Armenian side’s offer?
– Baku has connected the Azerbaijani invasion of the Armenian sovereign territory with the demarcation process. Deep down, Baku is inhibiting the negotiation process with such a position. Politically, it uses it so that agreements with the mediation of Brussels or the USA do not take place. That is why at this moment it does not recognize the territorial integrity of Armenia.
– Charles Michel also recorded that there is a debate about the specific ways to connect Nakhichevan to Azerbaijan to make sure that they respect Armenia’s sovereignty and legislation. What does th, EU explain to Azerbaijan?
– Here too, Baku is playing “one step forward, two steps back”. In Aliyev’s latest statements, there was no “corridor” edge. he was talking about the opening of communication routes, which in principle does not violate the territorial integrity of Armenia. But, I think, the knot is related to whether or not the opening roads are under Russian control. It’s Clause 9 of the November statement fixed the control of the Russian border guards. Now, the announcement of November 9 has been cancelled. By setting such a demand, Brussels sends a message to Azerbaijan and Russia at the same time.
– The President of the Russian Federation does not think that it is in Armenia’s interest to terminate the membership in the CIS, EAEU. Do you consider this just an opinion or does this statement have an implication?
– Moscow is well aware that there is dissatisfaction on the part of the Armenian side, and it is simultaneously inspired and manipulated by Washington and Brussels. Moscow is cooperating with the enemy state of its strategic ally, and it is clear that this will lead to a rising wave of discontent. However, placing the CSTO and EAEU in one basket has a simple implication. The Armenian side is dissatisfied with the CSTO, while being in the EAEU system gives Armenia an advantage to develop its economy in the current regional military-political conditions. The message is that one cannot leave the CSTO and remain in the EAEU.
– Bayramov, speaking about the Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, stated that Turkey’s participation in the negotiations will be useful for Armenia. Does this fit within the scope of Azerbaijan’s statements about the participation of a third impartial party in the negotiations?
– The concept of Turkey and an impartial party cannot be combined in this case. Baku is proposing a format of direct, unmediated negotiations, which is tantamount to expelling the West or excluding its guarantees. Currently, the various formats proposed by the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem exclude the participation of the West. 3+3 starts from the same motives.
– Will it be possible to finalize the text of the peace treaty at the meeting of the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan scheduled for January in Washington?
– It is difficult to predict when the contract will be signed. The West is working to finalize its guarantee. pressures Baku in that direction. O’Brian’s visit was followed by Aliyev’s decree on organizing early presidential elections in Azerbaijan, and that too within a very short time frame. I think that this is an indicator that there is pressure, and in return, a rush.
