Radar Armenia‘s interlocutor is political scientist Samvel Meliksetyan
– The border demarcation commissions of Armenia and Azerbaijan signed the regulation on Friday. Also, its text was published, which, after the government’s approval, should be sent to the Supreme Court and then to the National Assembly for ratification. In your opinion, what is the content of the regulation, and how much will it contribute to the demarcation process?
– These principles and the text correspond almost entirely to the recommendations in the well-known work published by the OSCE. In this regard, we are talking about a rather good text, for example, the point about the optimization of the border, which implies that in the case of Kirantsi, that part of the bridge and the road should have remained with Armenia and vice versa, if some parts of the road of Azerbaijani villages pass through the territory of Armenia. They pass to Azerbaijan. That lost territory to Armenia or Azerbaijan is compensated elsewhere from both sides. These principles are sound, but it should be understood that this process, its technical parts, with the creation of a new cartographic basis and organizational problems, is a rather lengthy process in which the political solutions and agreements that may be between Azerbaijan and Armenia will be more decisive and vital between the authorities. It should also be noted that until now, there was no clause about enclaves or exclaves in that regulation. Still, the published principles also allow the exchange of enclaves if the parties agree and follow the precedents between Belarus and Lithuania, which are the basis of the work of the OSCE.
– Nikol Pashinyan said that 13 of the 17 points of the peace agreement have been fully agreed upon, and it is possible to sign a peace agreement based on those 13 points and later discuss the issues that have not been agreed upon. Is it possible to do so, and how effective will it be?
– Of course, there can be such a document. It would be difficult to call it a final peace agreement because it is clear that there are many vital issues in those three points, which also contain the potential for conflict. Still, nevertheless, such a logic of settlement is essential when recording specific results, especially since this record is not the text of statements but of documents. There is no alternative or package solution at this stage of the settlement of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. However, de-escalating and resolving even the most minimal issues are welcome, as there is no alternative solution now. There are also no international stakeholders who can support and guarantee the creation of a new comprehensive document.
One of the most important issues, the problem of opening communications, has not been resolved. Moreover, judging by the reactions of the Armenian and Russian sides, point 9 of the tripartite statement is interpreted with a completely different logic. What will such a continuation lead to?
What is important here is not the November 9 statement but the recent statements made by Azerbaijan and Armenia, which indicate that the parties are removing the topic of communications and, first of all, the “corridor” from the text of the document to be signed, which they will return to in the future.
With such a pro-Azerbaijani statement, Russia is trying to interest Azerbaijan somehow and pressure Armenia to return to the format of Russian mediation. However, Azerbaijan is also not interested in Russian mediation. Of course, he would like solutions based on corridor logic in communication with Nakhichevan. However, this statement implies that, for now, neither side still needs to address this issue during discussions.
– How do you explain Russia’s recent activity in various directions? Is the reason for this activity the situation in the Russian-Ukrainian war?
– Russia’s activity is also connected with attempts to mobilize its possible allies to the maximum, aiming to raise the international image in these matters. It is clear that if Russia found specific solutions in the Armenian-Azerbaijani process, it would increase its ranking in the region, guaranteeing its extended presence. First of all, that presence should have been through an agreement with Azerbaijan because Azerbaijan is a much stronger actor in this region, and, in Russia’s perception, it is Azerbaijan that needs to be wooed to get guarantees for its presence in the area.
As I mentioned, Azerbaijan is not interested in this process. He is trying to make maximum use of Russia’s weakness. Still, the Russian presence in the “corridor,” the return to this region, and the strengthening of the area are not in the interests of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is interested in a weak Russia, which regularly makes various concessions to Azerbaijan, including energy concessions, and the latter can be a source of severe financial income for Azerbaijan. Here, Azerbaijan is acting according to the logic of a particular game. Confident that Armenia will not go to the format of tripartite mediation, he speaks about it himself and is ready for such a format. Of course, Russia also perceives this as a more constructive approach, but under this tendency, it will not be realized that Russia’s presence in the region will not be strengthened.
